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Student Note by Adam H. Wilson

WITHOUT A LEGGETT TO STAND ON:
ARGUING FOR RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF
WEST VIRGINIA¶S AMENDED FLAT-RATE WELL
STATUTE
What both the foregoing and the majority’s opinion underscores is the
necessity of the Legislature to address these policy-laden issues and declare, by
statute, the will of the State’s citizenry in this regard. This Court is constrained
to our canons of statutory construction and does not make policy. . . . Where the
Legislature’s inaction in the face of such significant changes in the industry
leaves this Court to intuit its intentions and/or retrofit outdated statutory
language to evolving factual scenarios, the will of the people is improperly
disregarded.
²Justice Margaret Workman1

Leggett v. EQT Prod. Co., 800 S.E.2d 850, 871 (W. Va. 2017) (Workman, J., concurring).
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Arnold and Mary Richards married in 1951 and, in 1954, bought a 264acre farm in Harrisville, West Virginia.2 Arnold worked as a millwright in nearby
Parkersburg for over 40 years, while Mary tended to the home and farm.3 The
couple initially owned half of the mineral rights beneath their land, and they
bought the remaining half over the years.4 The previous owner had drilled several
natural gas wells on the property, and the Richardses received modest royalty
payments from these wells.5
In 2014, EQT Corporation, America¶s largest natural gas producer,6
acquired the right to drill on the Richards¶s farm.7 EQT drilled six natural gas
wells into the couple¶s minerals,8 using hydraulic fracturing9 to produce the gas
trapped below.10 When the first check arrived, the Richards¶s royalty

2

3
4
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Ken Ward Jr., Royalty Disputes Continue as West Virginia’s Natural Gas Industry Booms,
CHARLESTON
GAZETTE-MAIL
(Nov.
13,
2018),
https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/wv_troubled_transition/royalty-disputes-continue-as-westvirginias-natural-gas-industry-booms/article_a7d1e5cc-4d36-507d-9b16-ecec73b26b0b.html.
Id.
Id.

5

Id.
Gerson Freitas Jr., EQT Continues Growth, Buying Chevron’s Appalachian Shale Gas
Assets, WORLD OIL (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.worldoil.com/news/2020/10/28/eqt-continuesgrowth-buying-chevron-s-appalachian-shale-gas-assets. EQT produces 44% more natural gas than
Exxon Mobil, its closest competitor. Id.
7
Ward Jr., supra note 2.
6

8

Transcript of Trial at 108, Richards v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 1:17±CV±50 (N.D. W. Va. Sept.
18±20, 2018).
9
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Hydraulic fracturing is the process of drilling a natural gas well by injecting water, sand,
and chemicals under high pressure into the oil or gas bearing rock formation; this stimulation
increases fluid flow and, consequently, production. What is Hydraulic Fracturing?, U.S.
GEOLOGICAL
SURV.,
https://www.usgs.gov/faqs/what-hydraulic-fracturing?qtnews_science_products=0#qt-news_science_products (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).
10
Ward Jr., supra note 2.
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skyrocketed, just as they expected.11 However, they were also shocked to learn
that EQT had witheld thousands of dollars of their royalty payment, charging the
couple for state severance taxes and operating expenses.12 Arnold contacted
EQT, wanting to know why the company charged him for these expenses; EQT
told Arnold that he would be paying part of these costs.13
The Richardses were unsatisfied with this answer and sued EQT for
diluting their royalty payments.14 EQT defended on the grounds that the couple
should be responsible for part of the taxes and expenses.15 Following a three-day
jury trial, the Richardses prevailed.16 The jury found that EQT had improperly
charged Arnold and Mary for expenses that mineral owners have no obligation
to pay.17 In all, EQT was forced to repay every penny withheld²a total of
$235,381.13²and was prohibited from charging the couple in the future.18
The Richards¶s story is, unfortunately, all too common among West
Virginia mineral owners. Natural gas companies promise to make each mineral
owner a millionaire within a matter of years and, in turn, receive permission to
drill for natural gas on their land.19 The company then drills several wells,
producing tens of millions of cubic feet of gas, only to minimize the royalty
payments by charging the mineral owner for ³post-production´ expenses.20
These expenses²the costs of gathering, processing, and transporting natural
gas²are deducted from the royalty payments and have become a point of
contention between gas companies and mineral owners.21
Royalty disputes are a recurring problem in West Virginia that are likely
to increase as the state¶s natural gas industry continues to grow.22 In 2007, a
Roane County jury returned a $404 million verdict against Columbia Natural
Resources after it charged mineral owners for post-production expenses without

Id.

12

Id.
Transcript of Trial, supra note 8, at 54±55.

13
14
15
16
17
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Id. at 55.
See id. at 123.
Id. at 269.
See id.

21
22

Id.
Ward Jr., supra note 2.
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18
Id. The Court granted the Richards¶V motion for a directed verdict regarding EQT
improperly deducting severance taxes from their royalties, and the jury found that EQT had
improperly charged the couple for post-production expenses. Id. at 201, 269.
19
Abrahm Lustgarten, Frackers Slash Billions in Payments to Landowners, PHILA. INQUIRER
(Aug. 27, 2013), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/business/Frackers_.html.
20
Id.

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 136 Side B

  

262

11/16/2021 08:40:42



ͳͳȀͻȀʹͲʹͳͳǣʹ

WEST
LAW
REVIEW
West Virginia
LawVIRGINIA
Review, Vol.
124,
Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 9

[Vol. 124

their knowledge.23 Twelve years later, EQT paid $53.5 million in a class action
settlement after diluting the royalties of approximately 9,000 mineral owners.24
Today, West Virginia¶s largest natural gas companies, such as Antero Resources,
EQT, and Jay-Bee Oil & Gas,25 face continuing ligation by mineral owners
seeking to recover unpaid royalties.26
Courts currently disagree whether certain royalties are chargeable with
post-production expenses.27 In 1982, the West Virginia Legislature enacted West
Virginia Code section 22-6-8, commonly known as the ³flat-rate´ statute,
intending to ensure mineral owners receive their fair share of natural gas
royalties.28 The statute¶s orginal language required royalties be based on the
proceeds at the first point of sale, which occurred immediately after the gas
exited the ground.29 Unfortunately, changing industry regulations, coupled with
creative accounting by natural gas companies, resulted in these companies using
the outdated statutory language to manipulate and dilute royalties paid to mineral
owners.30
In Leggett v. EQT Production Co., the West Virginia Supreme Court
attempted to address whether royalties paid according to section 22-6-8 are

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 136 Side B

23
Chris Dickerson, Three W.Va. Cases at Top of Big ‘07 Verdicts List, W. VA. RECORD (Feb.
29, 2008), https://wvrecord.com/stories/510593765-three-w-va-cases-at-top-of-big-07-verdictslist.
24
Kate Mishkin & Ken Ward Jr., Natural Gas Producer EQT to Pay $53.5M to Settle Royalty
Dispute,
CHARLESTON
GAZETTE-MAIL
(Feb.
13,
2019),
https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/wv_troubled_transition/natural-gas-producer-eqt-to-pay53-5m-to-settle-royalty-dispute/article_fd7fe399-be5b-5f32-b18c-4b0fcc80f7a9.html.
25
Charles Young, WV Oil and Gas Production Projections Optimistic; Industry Continues to
Set, Break Records, WV NEWS (Apr. 13, 2019), https://www.wvnews.com/news/wvnews/wv-oiland-gas-production-projections-optimistic-industry-continues-to/article_00fcaea8-7589-58ae8e51-2f1ad44bfbdb.html.
26
See, e.g., First Amended Class Action Complaint, Hopper v. Jay-Bee Oil & Gas, Inc., No.
5:20-CV-101 (N.D. W. Va. Oct. 21, 2020); First Amended Class Action Complaint, Wright v.
Antero Res. Corp., No. 1:20-CV-222 (N.D. W. Va. Oct. 14, 2020); Complaint, Williams v. EQT
Corp., No. 20-C-23 (Cir. Ct. Ritchie Cnty. July 8, 2020).
27
Compare Memorandum OpinioQ DQG 2UGHU 5HJDUGLQJ 'HIHQGDQW¶V 0RWLRQV LQ /LPLQH
Fout v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 1:15-CV-68, 2018 WL 1725608, at *7 (N.D. W. Va. Apr. 6, 2018)
(ruling that deductions taken from flat-rate royalties prior to enactment of Senate Bill 360 are
permissible), with Order Granting PlaintiffV¶ Motion to Have W. Va. Code § 22-6-8(e), as
Amended By Senate Bill 360, Determined as Controlling in this Case, Huey v. EQT Prod. Co., No.
17-C-43, at 17±18 (Cir. Ct. Wetzel Cnty. Sept. 9, 2020) (ruling that deductions taken prior to Senate
%LOO¶VHQDFWPHQWDUHSURKLELWHG and Order Granting PlaintiffV¶ Motion to Have W. Va. Code
§ 22-6-8(e), as Amended By Senate Bill 360, Determined as Controlling in this Case, Secrist v.
EQT Prod. Co., No. 14-C-19, at 19±20 (Cir. Ct. Doddridge Cnty. May 22, 2019) (same).
28
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Ward Jr., supra note 2.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-4-1 (West 1982) (requiring natural gas royalties be calculated ³at
the wellhead´) (later re-codified as W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-6-8 (West 1994)).
30
Ward Jr., supra note 2.
29
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subject to deductions for post-production expenses but reached conflicting
outcomes.31 The Court initially ruled, in Leggett I, that mineral owners receiving
royalties under the flat-rate statute cannot be charged for post-production
expenses.32 The Court reheard the case, however, and reversed itself in Leggett
II, holding that post-production expenses may be deducted from royalties paid
according to section 22-6-8.33 In Leggett II, the Court invited the Legislature to
resolve the conflict by amending the flat-rate statute, thereby clarifying whether
mineral owners may be charged for post-production expenses.34 The Legislature
responded to these invitations in 2018 by passing Senate Bill 360, which
amended the flat-rate statute and expressly stated that royalties cannot be diluted
with post-production expenses, effectively codifiying Leggett I¶s holding.35
This Note argues that Senate Bill 360 clarified, as opposed to altering, section
22-6-8 and the amended statute therefore applies retroactively, effectively
overruling Leggett II. Part II provides the necessary background information to
understand flat-rate leases and royalty calculations,36 while Part III explains the
flat-rate statute¶s purpose and effect on flat-rate royalties.37 Next, Part IV
explores the impact of natural gas pipeline deregulation on natural gas sales; 38
Part V discusses West Virginia¶s common law jurisprudence regarding royalty
disputes.39 Part VI then analyzes Leggett I and Leggett II before examining the
legislative history of Senate Bill 360.40 Finally, Part VII argues that Senate Bill
360 clarified section 22-6-8¶s prohibition of post-production expenses and
therefore applies retroactively.41

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 137 Side A

31
Compare Leggett v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 16-0136, 2016 W. Va. LEXIS 890, at *22±23 (W.
Va. Nov. 17, 2016) [hereinafter Leggett I] (prohibiting natural gas companies from deducting postproduction expenses from flat-rate royalties), with Leggett v. EQT Prod. Co, 800 S.E.2d 850, 867
(W. Va. 2017) [hereinafter Leggett II] (allowing natural gas companies to deduct post-production
expenses from flat-rate royalties).
32
33

Leggett I, 2016 W. Va. LEXIS 890, at *22±23.
Leggett II, 800 S.E.2d at 867.

34

Id. at 869; id. at 871 (Workman, J., concurring).
Rusty Marks, Senate Passes Game-Changing Gas Royalties Bill, WV NEWS, (Feb. 28, 2018)
https://www.wvnews.com/news/wvnews/senate-passes-game-changing-gas-royaltiesbill/article_a6187ec5-fb64-5326-af2a-1a5f6329b469.html.
35

36
37
38

40
41

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part VII.
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See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
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A CRASH COURSE IN OIL AND GAS

This Note focuses on natural gas leases, post-production expenses, and
royalty calculations. Because these topics are quite complex, some background
information is needed before examining each in detail. Section A explains the
different types of leases used in the natural gas industry,42 and Section B explores
what post-production expenses natural gas companies charge mineral owners.43
Finally, Section C examines natural gas companies¶ preferred method of
calculating royalties: the net-back method.44
A. Mineral Lease Basics
Before a gas well is drilled, a contract must be executed between the
mineral owner and gas company.45 This agreement is referred to as the mineral
lease; the mineral owner is the lessor, while the gas company is the lessee.46 Each
lease contains express promises and implied covenants that both parties bind
themselves to for the mutual benefit of one another.47 The royalty clause is
perhaps the most important lease provision. A ³royalty´ is the mineral owner¶s
compensation for the natural gas once it has been produced and sold.48 Today,
natural gas is sold per thousand cubic feet (MCF), and royalties are based on the
volume of gas sold, often one-eighth (12.5%) of the sale proceeds.49 Leases that
pay a volume-based royalty are known as ³freely negotiated´ leases because the
royalty is a product of free negotiations between the lessor and lessee.50
However, natural gas royalties have not always been related to the
volume of gas sold.51 During the oil and gas industry¶s infancy, wells were drilled
with the aim of producing oil, and it was considered a waste when a well only
produced natural gas.52 This is because, during the late 1800s and early 1900s,

43

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 137 Side B

42

See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.B.

44

See infra Section II.C.
Law v. Heck Oil Co., 145 S.E. 601 (W. Va. 1928) (holding that a non-consenting mineral
owner may enjoin a co-tenant¶s lessee from developing shared minerals).
46
Oil
and
Gas
Lease,
SCHLUMBERGER,
https://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/en/terms/o/oil_and_gas_lease (last visited Sept. 20, 2021).
47
See Parish Fork Oil Co. v. Bridgewater Gas Co., 42 S.E. 655, 658 (1902).
45

48

Davis v. Hardman, 133 S.E.2d 77, 81 (W. Va. 1963).
LARRY L. SKEEN, WEST VIRGINIA OIL AND GAS LAW § 2.6.1 (1984); see also How Natural
Gas is Measured, TULSA GAS TECH., INC., https://www.tulsagastech.com/measure.html (last
visited Sept. 20, 2021).
49

51
52

3 EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 40.2 (2021).
Id. § 40.1.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol124/iss1/9
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50
See Leggett II, 800 S.E.2d 850, 861 (W. Va. 2017) (citing Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d
652, 664 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (Erickson, J., concurring)).
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there was no infrastructure²natural gas pipelines²to gather and transport the
gas to a buyer.53 Without pipelines in place, there was no market for the
product.54 Frequently, after the gas well was drilled, the lessor was allowed to
access the gas and use it for his own residential purposes.55 Other times, the well
was abandoned altogether.56 Until the 1920s, standard leases reflected these
limitations and included a ³flat-rate´ royalty clause.57 A flat-rate royalty is just
that: a fixed payment to the lessor, not for the volume of gas sold, but instead for
the right to have a well located on the leased premises.58 Flat-rate leases
commonly referred to this as a ³gas rental´ and paid an annual sum that varied
from $50 to a few hundred dollars per well.59
Mineral leases, oil and gas leases specifically, have a unique feature that
allows the lease to continue indefinitely. Each lease contains a ³primary term´
that specifies the timeframe during which drilling operations have to begin.60 If
a producing well is not drilled before the primary term¶s end, the lease terminates
and both parties are freed from all obligations under the lease.61 Leases also
include a ³secondary term´ that becomes effective once production begins.62 The
secondary term typically includes language that allows the lease to continue for
³so long as [oil or gas is] produc[ed] in paying quantities.´63 The secondary
term¶s effect is significant: the lease remains active for so long as the operator
reports production in paying quantities and allows the minerals to be ³held by
production.´64 In addition, the lease¶s terms apply to each additional well drilled
on the property and also prevent the lease from terminating.65 Consequently,

53

SKEEN, supra note 49, § 2.6.1.

54

Id.
4 KUNTZ, supra note 51, § 53.6; ROBERT DONLEY, THE LAW OF COAL, OIL AND GAS IN WEST
VIRGINIA AND VIRGINIA § 157 (1951).
56
See 4 KUNTZ, supra note 51, § 53.6.
55

58
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57

Id. § 40.2.
DONLEY, supra note 55, § 156.

59

3 KUNTZ, supra note 51, § 40.2; SKEEN, supra note 49, § 2.6.1. See, e.g., McGinnis v.
Cayton, 312 S.E.2d 765, 767 (W. Va. 1984) (flat-rate lease executed in 1893 requiring an annual
royalty of $100 per well); McGraw Oil & Gas Co. v. Kennedy, 64 S.E. 1027, 1027 (W. Va. 1909)
(flat-rate lease executed in 1899 paying an annual royalty of $200 per well).
60
61

Warner v. Haught, Inc., 329 S.E.2d 88, 92±93 (W. Va. 1985).
Id.

62
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SKEEN, supra note 49, § 2.4.1.
McCullough Oil, Inc. v. Rezek, 346 S.E.2d 788, 794 (W. Va. 1986) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
64
HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 473 (Patrick
H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer eds.,16th ed. 2015).
65
Owen L. Anderson, Calculating Royalty: “Costs” Subsequent to Production—“Figures
Don’t Lie, But. . .”, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 591, 593 (1994) (³[T]here are thousands of existing [leases]
. . . that could remain in effect for decades by reason of ongoing production´); see also Ascent
63
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many flat-rate leases executed at the turn of the twentieth century remain active
to this very day, so long as there has not been a sufficient lapse in production to
terminate the lease.66
B. From the Wellhead to Buyer: Post-Production Expenses
Post-production expenses are a contentious²and at times litigious²
matter between mineral owners and natural gas companies.67 These are not
merely the costs of compressing and transporting natural gas but each expense
incurred between the wellhead and eventual third-party buyer. This Section
describes each post-production expense and details the process of gathering,
treating, and transporting natural gas.
Natural gas is trapped in deposits, commonly known as reservoirs,68
located thousands of feet below the earth¶s surface.69 Raw natural gas consists of
numerous hydrocarbons, including methane, ethane, propane, butane, and
occasionally pentane.70 Methane, the lightest component part,71 is separated,
marketed, and sold individually for consumer and industrial use through the
interstate pipeline.72
Isolating methane from the remaining constituent parts is no trivial
matter; the gas must pass through an intricate series of pipelines and equipment
before becoming a marketable product. Natural gas first passes through the
³wellhead´ after exiting the ground; this is the permanent steel fitting that sits
atop the well.73 Almost immediately after leaving the wellhead, the gas travels
through the ³separator,´ which removes all liquids from the gas stream.74 The

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 138 Side B

Res. - Marcellus, L.L.C. v. Huffman, 851 S.E.2d 782, 784 (W. Va. 2020) ³7KH>RULJLQDO@OHDVHLV
still in effect because wells drilled on the tract continue to producHRLODQGJDV´ .
66
See, e.g., Haynes v. Antero Res. Corp., No. 15±1203, 2016 WL 6542734, at *1 (W. Va. Oct.
28, 2016) (memorandum decision) (noting that minerals originally leased in 1898 remain held by
production).
67
Robert S. Raynes, Jr., Note, A Royalty Pain in the Gas: What Costs May Be Properly
Deducted From A Gas Royalty Interest?, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 1199, 1200 (1996).
68
RICHARD C. SELLEY & STEPHEN A. SONNENBERG, ELEMENTS OF PETROLEUM GEOLOGY 255
(3d ed. 2015).
69
Natural
Gas,
NAT¶L
GEOGRAPHIC,
https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/natural-gas/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2021).
70
SELLEY & SONNENBERG, supra note 68, at 14±15.
71
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WILLIAM D. MCCAIN, JR., THE PROPERTIES OF PETROLEUM FLUIDS 492 (2d ed. 1990).
Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373, 378 (2015) (explaining that natural gas is bought
and sold through the interstate pipeline).
73
NORMAN J. HYNE, NONTECHNICAL GUIDE TO PETROLEUM GEOLOGY, EXPLORATION,
DRILLING & PRODUCTION 358 (3d ed. 2012).
74
Id. at 375.
72
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gas stream then travels a short distance to a nearby meter that measures the
volume of gas produced.75
Next, it flows through a series of pipelines called ³gathering lines´ that
gather and collect gas from nearby wells before merging at a central gathering
location.76 Once there, a transmission pipeline consolidates the gas from several
gathering lines.77 The gas is compressed during this transition to increase its
pressure, making it easier to transport larger volumes of gas.78 After entering the
transmission pipeline, the gas travels to a processing facility where it is further
divided into its component parts79 using a process known as ³fractionation.´80
Once isolated, and therefore marketable, the methane enters the interstate
pipeline81 where an unaffiliated third-party buyer purchases the gas in an arm¶s
length transaction.82 Natural gas companies paying royalties via the net-back
method must account for each expense incurred between the wellhead and buyer,
which is then charged to the mineral owner.83
C. The Net-Back Method in Theory
Natural gas royalties have historically been based on the gross proceeds
from the gas sold at the wellhead.84 This is no longer the practice because, as
discussed infra,85 changes in regulatory policy have moved the first point of sale

75
76

Id. at 386.
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 64, at 441±42.

77
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What is the Difference Between Gathering and Transmission Pipelines?, PA. ENERGY
INFRASTRUCTURE ALL. (June 26, 2017), https://paallianceforenergy.com/difference-gatheringtransmission-pipelines/.
78
Dave Messersmith, Understanding Natural Gas Compressor Stations, PENN STATE
EXTENSION, (Mar. 26, 2015), https://extension.psu.edu/understanding-natural-gas-compressorstations.
79

84
85

DONLEY, supra note 55, § 104; Keeling, supra note 82, at 517.
See infra Part IV.
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WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 64, at 825±26. See generally Burns v. Exxon Corp., 892
F. Supp. 914, 916 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (quoting Freeland v. Sun Oil Co., 184 F. Supp. 754, 756 (W.D.
La. 1959), aff’d, 277 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1960)), aff’d, 158 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 1998).
80
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 64, at 413 (³Fractionation is the process whereby mixed
natural gas or µraw make¶ is separated into its component parts.´).
81
Natural Gas Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Jan. 15, 2021),
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/natural-gas/delivery-and-storage.php.
82
See generally Byron C. Keeling, In the New Era of Oil and Gas Royalty Accounting:
Drafting a Royalty Clause That Actually Says What the Parties Intend It to Mean, 69 BAYLOR L.
REV. 516, 524±25 (2017) (discussing how different courts allow lessees to calculate royalties when
intra-company sales are made).
83
Kilmer v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 990 A.2d 1147, 1154 (Pa. 2010).
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further ³downstream,´86 away from the wellhead. As a result, there is no longer
a market for natural gas at the wellhead.87 Leases executed prior to this shift,
however, specified that royalties must be based on the value at the wellhead.88
Currently, the downstream value of natural gas is higher than that at the
wellhead; this price difference is a direct result of the costs of gathering, treating,
and transporting the gas to the market.89
Lessees that attempt to stay true to history and, coincidentally, pay a
smaller royalty, have developed a system to recreate the lower wellhead price.
Known as the ³net-back´ method, this process attempts to estimate the value of
natural gas if it were sold at the wellhead.90 Lessees argue that the only accurate
way to determine the price difference between the true market value91 and
artificial wellhead price is to deduct each post-production expense from the
amount received.92
The net-back method requires the lessee account for, allocate, and deduct
expenses from the gross proceeds before paying the lessor¶s royalty. The lessee
first takes the gross price received at the interstate pipeline²the first point of
sale²and deducts numerous expenses.93 These expenses typically include, but
are not limited to,94 the costs of gathering, processing, and transporting the gas.95

86
³Downstream´ refers to operations performed after a specified reference point. WILLIAMS
& MEYERS, supra note 64, at 285. This Note uses the natural gas well itself as the reference point,
and all operations occurring beyond the well are considered downstream.
87

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 139 Side B

Leggett II, 800 S.E.2d 850, 857 (W. Va. 2017) (³As a result [of deregulation], oil and gas
are no longer sold µat the wellhead,¶ but rather are sold downstream of the wellhead, typically at
the interstate pipeline.´).
88
Keeling, supra note 82 DW  ³Until fairly recently, the vast majority
of royalty clauses required that the lessee calculate its royalty payments µat the well¶ or µat the
wellhead.¶´).
89

Leggett II, 800 S.E.2d at 857 (³[O]ne of the effects of [post-production operations] . . . is
that the sales price is enhanced from the wellhead price because it is now a marketable, useable
product when it is first sold at market ´).
90
Kilmer v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 990 A.2d 1147, 1149 (Pa. 2010) (³This calculation is
called the µnet-back method,¶ as its goal is to determine the value of the gas when it leaves the
[wellhead] ´).
91
The ³market value´ of natural gas is the price that a willing buyer would pay to a willing
seller in a free market. 3 KUNTZ, supra note 51, § 40.4.

94
95

See infra Section VII.B.
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 64, at 800.
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92
Leggett II, 800 S.E.2d at 853± ³EQT maintains that the only way to capture the
statutorily-required µwellhead¶ price is to utilize this so-called µnet-back¶ or µwork-back¶ method
which deducts postproduction expenses from the sales price to duplicate the µwellhead¶ price.´ 
93
Young v. Equinor USA Onshore Props., Inc., 982 F.3d 201, 203±04 (4th Cir. 2020).

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 140 Side A

 

11/16/2021 08:40:42



ͳͳȀͻȀʹͲʹͳͳǣʹ

2021]
WITHOUT A LEGGETT
TO STAND
ON for Retroactive A269
Wilson: Without a <em>Leggett</em>
to Stand
On: Arguing

The lessee then charges the lessor his pro rata share96 of each expenditure.97
After each expense has been accounted for, apportioned to the lessor, and
deducted, the lessee can estimate the wellhead price.98 This artificial, net price is
used to calculate the lessor¶s royalty instead of the gross price received by the
lessee.99
A hypothetical is helpful to illustrate the net-back method¶s financial
impact on mineral owners. For example, suppose Joe inherited a 50-acre mineral
estate from his grandfather in Ritchie County, West Virginia. Prior to his death,
Joe¶s grandfather leased the minerals to Robin Gas Company (³Robin Gas´). The
lease provides for a standard one-eighth royalty, meaning Joe will receive 12.5%
of the proceeds from the gas sold from his minerals.
Robin Gas recently drilled a single natural gas well on the property that
produces approximately 500,000,000 cubic feet of gas (500,000 MCF) each
month. The market price of gas is $2.50/MCF, and Robin Gas receives
$1,250,000 in gross proceeds each month. Before paying Joe¶s royalty, Robin
Gas must use the net-back method to recreate the wellhead value of gas. Robin
Gas is notorious for charging mineral owner¶s for excessive expenses, and Joe is
no exception. Unsurprisingly, his royalty is reduced by 40% once Robin Gas
calculates the wellhead value as $1.50/MCF. If Robin Gas used the true market
price, Joe would receive $15,625 for his share of the natural gas. Unfortunately,
his royalty is based on the artificial wellhead value and his check reflects that
fact. Joe¶s monthly royalty is $9,375, over $6,000 less than it would be if Robin
Gas paid the royalty based on the gross proceeds instead of the net proceeds.
III.

ORIGINAL ENACTMENT OF THE FLAT-RATE STATUTE

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 140 Side A

As the natural gas industry evolved, several innovations revolutionized
business practices and were unforeseen by the parties to flat-rate leases. First,
drilling technology improved dramatically during the industry¶s first 100
years.100 Gas companies were able to drill further into the earth, producing gas

96

The lessor¶s pro rata share is the product of her royalty interest (usually one-eighth), net
mineral acres owned, and the percentage of her minerals included in the entire pool. How Do I
Calculate My Royalty Interest Within a Pooled Unit?, GATEWAY ROYALTY (July 29, 2019),
https://gatewayroyaltyllc.com/how-do-i-calculate-my-royalty-interest-within-a-pooled-unit/.
97
See, e.g., Young, 982 F.3d at 205 (detailing the calculations used to charge lessors for postproduction expenses).
98

Leggett II, 800 S.E.2d 850, 866 (W. Va. 2017).
Id.

100

Drilling Through History, DRILLER, https://www.thedriller.com/drilling-history (last visited
Sept. 23, 2021).
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that was previously believed unreachable.101 Additionally, gas recovery
techniques improved substantially; drillers were able to extract more gas from
the reservoir than in decades prior.102 Second, the introduction of high-pressure
pipelines created a market for natural gas.103 Gas companies could, for the first
time, transport the gas to a buyer rather than wasting it.104 Neither party to flatrate leases contemplated these developments at the time of signing the lease.105
Otherwise, the royalty would be based on a portion of the sales proceeds, as
opposed to a fixed, rental rate.106
Flat-rate lessors suffered the consequences of these unforeseen
developments. Prior to the 1930s²when flat rate leases were used²the lessor
received adequate compensation for his minerals.107 For example, in 1925, a
lessor receiving a $300 royalty could purchase a Ford Model T with money to
spare.108 Unfortunately, this quickly changed because flat-rate leases did not
account for inflation, nor did they allow the lessor to receive a share of the gas
sale proceeds once a market developed.109 To add insult to injury, because the
minerals could be held by production, lessors continued to receive the same fixed
amount for decades, despite new wells being drilled with these modern
techniques.110 The inequity soon became apparent when lessees were selling the
gas and keeping the entire proceeds, except the nominal royalty payment due to
the lessor.111
In 1982, the West Virginia Legislature convened, intending to eradicate
this unfair practice. The Legislature enacted the ³flat-rate´ statute, originally
codified at West Virginia Code section 22-4-1 (later re-codified as section 22-6-
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101
Louis Bergeron, Extracting Natural Gas from Shale Can Be Done in an Environmentally
Responsible Way, Says Stanford Researcher on Government Panel, STAN. (Aug. 30, 2011),
https://news.stanford.edu/news/2011/august/zoback-fracking-qanda-083011.html.
102
Id.
103
See Robert J. Michaels, Natural Gas: Markets and Regulation, LIBR. OF ECON. & LIBERTY,
https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/NaturalGasMarketsandRegulation.html (last visited Sept. 23,
2021).
104
SKEEN, supra note 49, § 2.6.1.
105
See Ken Ward Jr., Century-Old West Virginia Leases Yield Paltry Gas Royalties. A Suit
Could Cut Others’ Payouts to a Trickle, Too., PROPUBLICA (Nov. 14, 2018, 5:00 AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/west-virginia-leases-yield-paltry-gas-royalties.
106
See id.
107

Ward Jr., supra note 2.
Brock Holloway, How Much Money Did the Ford Model T Cost, MOTOR BISCUIT (June 11,
2020), https://www.motorbiscuit.com/how-much-money-did-the-ford-model-t-cost/. Ford charged
$260 for a Model T in 1925. Id.
108

110
111

Id.
Id.
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109
See Ward Jr., supra note 105 (noting that flat-rate lessors receive $12 and $36 annually for
their proportionate share of royalties in 2018).
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8)112 and forever changed how flat-rate lessors would be compensated for their
valuable minerals. The Legislature meticulously detailed its basis for enacting
the statute; the findings and declarations clause expressly stated the legislative
intent to prohibit lessees from exploiting flat-rate lessors.113 First, a significant
amount of natural gas was subject to development under flat-rate leases that paid
the mineral owner based solely on the existence of a producing well instead of
the volume of gas produced.114 Second, flat-rate leases provided mineral owners
with ³wholly inadequate´ compensation that was unfair, oppressive, and worked
an unjust hardship on mineral owners.115 Finally, flat-rate leases were decades
old and had been entered into at a time when neither the modern technology, nor
the depths natural gas was produced from, were known or contemplated by the
parties.116
Based on these findings, the Legislature declared that it was West
Virginia¶s policy to prevent natural gas production under flat-rate leases.117
Consequently, the Legislature found that the State had an obligation to prohibit
issuing a drilling permit for future wells that would pay a flat-rate royalty.118 A
lessee could, however, escape this permit prohibition by agreeing to pay the
lessor a one-eighth royalty.119 The lessee could do so by submitting, in his permit
application, an affidavit swearing the lessor would be paid ³not less than one
eighth of the total amount paid to or received by [the lessee] at the wellhead´ in
exchange for the gas produced and sold.120
Contrary to critics of the flat-rate statute,121 the Legislature did not
impair existing contractual obligations.122 Rather than amending or nullifying
flat-rate leases, the statute prohibited the West Virginia Department of
Environmental Protection from issuing new permits to drill a well under a flat-

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 141 Side A

112
The flat-rate statute was originally codified at West Virginia Code section 22-4-1 (1982);
the Legislature later re-codified the statute at West Virginia Code section 22B-1-8 (1985) before it
was ultimately re-codified at West Virginia Code section 22-6-8 (1994).
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-4-1(a)(2) (West 1982).
Id. § 22-4-1(a)(1).
Id. § 22-4-1(a)(2).
Id. § 22-4-1(a)(3).
Id. § 22-4-1(b).
Id.
Id. § 22-4-1(e).
Id.

121
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Brad McElhinny, EQT Sues WV Government Over New Royalties Law, METRO NEWS (Apr.
14, 2018, 6:35 PM), https://wvmetronews.com/2018/04/14/eqt-sues-wv-government-over-newroyalties-law/.
122
Section 10, Article I, Clause 10 of the United States Constitution and Section 4, Article III
of the Constitution of West Virginia each prohibit the Legislature from impairing contractual
obligations. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 4.
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rate lease.123 Wells drilled prior to enactment were unaffected by the statute and
continued to pay a nominal royalty.124 Following enactment, however, operators
would be denied a permit if the lease did not include a royalty tied directly to
production; a permit could be granted only if the operator submitted an affidavit,
included in the permit application, that stated the mineral owner would receive
not less than a one-eighth royalty.125 Therefore, the flat-rate statute did not impair
existing contracts. Rather, its only effect was to ensure no future wells would be
drilled unless the mineral owner received at least a one-eighth royalty.
IV.

TURBULENT TIMES: NATURAL GAS PIPELINE DEREGULATION

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 141 Side B

Although the West Virginia Legislature took great care to ensure that
flat-rate lessors receive adequate compensation for their minerals, one variable
remained that it could not control: natural gas pipeline regulations. The
Legislature specified that royalties paid according to section 22-6-8 must be
valued ³at the wellhead´126 because, in 1982, federal regulations required the first
point of sale be at the wellhead.127 Changing industry regulations, however,
dramatically changed the natural gas sales market, leaving the statutory
language²³at the wellhead´²outdated.
During the 1920s, high-pressure, steel pipelines were constructed that
could transport natural gas over long distances at relatively low costs.128 State
public utility companies (³PUCs´) initially regulated these pipelines; however,
conflicting regulations from each PUC proved too problematic for interstate
pipeline companies to manage.129 As a result, Congress passed the Natural Gas
Act of 1938 (³NGA´) and required the Federal Power Commission (³FPC´) to
regulate interstate pipelines.130
The NGA heavily regulated the natural gas industry and featured three
significant constraints. First, under the NGA, all natural gas sales took place at
the wellhead.131 Second, these wellhead sales were made between the producer

123
Section 22-6-6 states that, if all statutory requirements are met, the Director of the West
Virginia Department of Environmental Protection will issue a drilling permit. See W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 22-6-6 (West 1994).
124
See id. § 22-4-1(d) (stating that no permit shall be issued in the future to drill or rework an
existing well unless the lessee pays a one-eighth royalty).
125
Id. § 22-4-1(e).
126
127

Id.
See Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

128
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Evolution of Natural Gas Regulatory Policy, 10 NAT. RES. &
ENV¶T 53, 53 (1995).

130
131

Id.
See Associated Gas Distribs., 824 F.2d at 993.
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129
Id. Interstate pipeline companies encountered conflicting regulatory orders and protectionist
regulatory policies from various state PUCs. Id.
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(the lessee) and pipeline company (the third-party buyer),132 in arm¶s-length
transactions.133 Third, the pipeline company²acting entirely independent from
other market participants²had a monopoly and only transported the gas that it
sold.134 This last feature, known as ³bundled´ services, was the hallmark of the
NGA for 40 years.135
During the mid-1970s, the NGA¶s regulations caused major natural gas
shortages, which prompted Congress to change course and deregulate the
industry.136 Congress first passed the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (³NGPA´).
The NGPA allowed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (³FERC´)137 to
authorize pipelines to offer ³unbundled´ services and transport gas sold by thirdparties.138 FERC responded in 1985 by issuing Order Number 436, which enticed
pipelines to give up their monopoly power and provide unbundled services.139
Order Number 436¶s effect on the industry impressed Congress, who next
enacted the Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989 (³NGWDA´), which
ratified FERC¶s de facto industry deregulation.140 In 1992, FERC promulgated
Order Number 636 and formally deregulated the natural gas sales market.141
Order Number 636 required interstate pipeline companies to offer unbundled
services, effectively acting as common-carriers for natural gas.142 Today, natural
gas companies market the gas themselves and pay pipeline companies to
transport the product to the downstream market.143

132

Id.

133
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Bradford Ross & Bernard A. Foster, Jr., Phillips and the Natural Gas Act, 19 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 382, 387 (1954).
134
Joseph Fagan, From Regulation to Deregulation: The Diminishing Role of the Small
Consumer Within the Natural Gas Industry, 29 TULSA L.J. 707, 712±13 (1994).
135
Natural gas pipeline companies only offered bundled services from 1938 until 1978, when
Congress began deregulating the industry. Id. at 717±18.
136

Id. at 716.
FERC was formed in 1977, effectively replacing the FPC. DOE Spotlight: Federal Energy
Regulatory
Commission,
CHESTER
ENERGY
&
POL¶Y
(Jan.
25,
2018),
http://chesterenergyandpolicy.com/2018/01/25/doe-spotlight-federal-energy-regulatorycommission/.
138
Fagan, supra note 134, at 717±18.
137

139
140
141

Id.
Fagan, supra note 134, at 726±27.

143

Joyce Colson, Upstream, Midstream, Downstream—The Valuation of Royalties on Federal
Oil and Gas Leases, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 563, 593 (1999).
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Pierce, Jr., supra note 128, at 55.
Id. at 84.
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THE TAWNEY TEST: WEST VIRGINIA¶S COMMON LAW COST
ALLOCATION DOCTRINE

While the unbundling of natural gas pipeline services improved the
natural gas sales market, it also raised new questions.144 Most notably, who
should bear the costs of gathering, treating, and transporting natural gas to the
first point of sale became a heavily litigated issue.145 Two doctrines of cost
allocation ultimately emerged in oil and gas producing states.146 Several states
adopted the ³marketable product rule,´ which requires the lessee to pay all costs
until the gas is marketable or ready to be sold.147 Alternatively, other states
embraced the ³at the wellhead´ rule, demanding the lessor pay his pro rata share
of expenses between the wellhead and first point of sale.148 West Virginia,
however, did not address the issue for nearly a decade. Finally, in 2001, the
question arose in the seminal case of Wellman v. Energy Resources, Inc.149
James and Grace Wellman were lessors in two oil and gas leases
covering 200 and 23.5 acres, respectively, located in Logan County, West
Virginia.150 Energy Resources, Inc. (³Energy Resources´), the lessee, had leased
the minerals from the Wellmans¶s predecessor-in-title; both leases were identical
for all practical purposes.151 Each lease required the lessee pay the lessors a
royalty of ³one-eighth (1/8) of the proceeds from the sale of gas as such at the
mouth of the well where gas . . . is found.´152

144
Clough v. Williams Prod. RMT Co., 179 P.3d 32, 36 (Colo. App. 2007) (referring to natural
gas pipeline deregulation as ³the major catalyst for the current wave of royalty litigation.´).
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145
Owen L. Anderson, Royalty Valuation: Should Royalty Obligations be Determined
Intrinsically, Theoretically, or Realistically?, 37 NAT. RES. J. 547, 553 (1997).
146

Raynes, Jr., supra note 67, at 1205±06.
Sternberger v. Marathon Oil Co., 894 P.2d 788, 799 (Kan. 1995) (³7he lessee has the duty
to produce a marketable product, and the lessee alone bears the expense in making the product
marketable.´); Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652, 659 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (³>7@he implied
covenant to market obligates the lessee to incur those post-production costs necessary to place gas
in a condition acceptable for market.´); Wood v. TXO Prod. Co., 854 P.2d 880, 882 (Okla. 1992)
(³>7@he lessee¶s duty to market . . . include[s] the cost of preparing the gas for market.´).
148
Schroeder v. Terra Energy, Ltd., 565 N.W.2d 887, 894 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (³>,@t
necessarily follows that to determine the royalty valuation, postproduction costs must be subtracted
from the sales price of the gas where it is subsequently marketed.´); Heritage Res., Inc. v.
NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 123 (Tex. 1996) (³[The lessee] must pay a royalty based on the
market value at the point of sale less the reasonable post-production marketing costs.´); Atl.
Richfield Co. v. State, 214 Cal. App. 3d 533, 541 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (³>7@he lessor of an oil and
gas lease . . . bears [his] proportionate share of processing costs incurred downstream of the well.´).
147

149

151
152

557 S.E.2d 254 (W. Va. 2001).
Id. at 257.
Id.
Id. at 257±58.
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Energy Resources entered upon the 23.5-acre tract and, for
approximately five years, operated a single natural gas well.153 During this time,
Energy Resources sold the gas for $2.22 per MCF, but paid the Wellmans¶s
royalty as though the gas sold for $0.87 per MCF.154 The Wellmans sued Energy
Resources for these unpaid royalties and alleged that they had been shortchanged because Energy Resources improperly charged them with expenses.155
The Court began assessing the Wellmans¶s claim by noting that the
mineral owner¶s royalty has traditionally been paid based on the first point of
sale156 and is not chargeable with the costs of discovery and production.157
Recently, the Court noted, lessees have tried to escape this rule by labeling
certain operating expenses as ³post-production expenses,´ which are in turn
charged to the lessor.158
The Court recognized that in West Virginia, the lessee impliedly
covenants to market the oil or gas produced under the lease; this duty to market
includes the responsibility of placing the gas in a marketable condition and
transporting it to the market.159 Moreover, the lessee has historically borne the
costs of complying with all lease covenants.160 Therefore, the Court found that
the lessee should bear the costs associated with marketing the gas.161 The Court
ultimately held that when an oil and gas lease provides for a royalty based on
sale proceeds, the lessee must bear all costs associated with exploring for,
producing, marketing, and transporting the gas to the first point of sale, unless
the lease provides otherwise.162 When the lease provides that the lessor shall bear
some portion of these expenses, the lessee is entitled to credit for these costs to
the extent they were actually incurred and reasonable.163

153

155
156

Id. at 258.
Id.
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154

Id.
Id. at 263 (quoting DONLEY, supra note 55, § 104).

157

Id. at 263±64 (citing Davis v. Hardman, 133 S.E.2d 77 (W. Va. 1963)).
Id. at 264. These expenses include the costs of placing the gas in a marketable condition and
transporting to the point of sale. Id.
159
Id. at 265.
158

160

Id.
Id. The Court found that, although the lease language could have indicated that the lessor
should bear some portion of the post-production expenses, Energy Resources provided no evidence
to prove these expenses were actually incurred or reasonable. Id. See infra note 163.
161

162
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Wellman, 557 S.E.2d at 265.
Id. Before being entitled to these deductions, the lessee must prove, by evidence of the type
normally developed in legal proceedings requiring an accounting, that these costs were actually
incurred and reasonable. Id. The Court further elaborated on this ³reasonableness´ standard, stating
that ³the law¶s allowance of reasonable costs . . . is not an invitation to or sanction of creative
accounting.´ These costs ³must be objectively reasonable . . . [and] actually incurred in the
163
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Five years later, the Court faced the question that Wellman left
unanswered: what lease language is sufficient to charge the lessor with his pro
rata share of post-production expenses?164 Plaintiffs/lessors in Estate of Tawney
v. Columbia Natural Resources, L.L.C., brought a class action lawsuit against
Columbia Natural Resources, L.L.C. (³Columbia´) for improperly deducting
post-production expenses from their natural gas royalties.165 The majority of
leases indicated that royalties were to be calculated ³at the wellhead,´ although
the gas was sold further downstream.166
Columbia charged the lessors with the costs of processing and
transporting the gas; these deductions were taken in equal amounts, regardless of
how far the gas travelled.167 The lessors received royalty checks that purported
to state the amount of gas produced, the price for which gas was sold, and the
amount of their royalty.168 Columbia did not disclose that it was deducting postproduction expenses from the lessors¶ royalties.169
The Court found the lease language ambiguous170 and therefore
insufficient to escape Wellman¶s holding that the lessor must receive a royalty
based on the sale price.171 Although the language potentially indicated that the
royalty should be calculated at the wellhead, it shed no light as to how or by what
method a lessee may do so.172 Equally important, the leases were silent altogether
on the allocation of post-production expenses.173
In its holding, the Court set forth a three-prong test that must be met
before lessees can deduct post-production expenses. Leases that intend to
allocate post-production expenses between the lessor and lessee must: (1)

operation of the well in question.´Bryan v. Big Two Mile Gas Co., 577 S.E.2d 258, 270 (W. Va.
2001).
165

Est. of Tawney v. Columbia Nat. Res., L.L.C., 633 S.E.2d 22, 24±25 (W. Va. 2006).
Id. at 25.

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 143 Side B

164

166

Id. Other leases contained similar language, calling for royalties to be calculated ³at the
well,´ ³at the wellhead,´ ³net all costs beyond the wellhead,´ or ³less all taxes, assessments, and
adjustments.´Id.
167
Id.
168
169

Id.
Id.

170

172
173

Id. at 28.
Id.
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Id. at 28±29. Columbia argued that when ³at the wellhead´ was read with accompanying
lease language, such as ³gross proceeds,´ the lease clearly called for post-production expenses to
be allocated between lessor and lessee. Id. at 28. The Court rejected this argument, pointing out
that these terms, when read together, imply that royalties will be paid on the gross price received
by the lessee because ³gross´ means no deductions will be taken. Id. Alternatively, these phrases
could create an inherent conflict because the gas was not sold at the wellhead; such inherent conflict
created ambiguity. Id. at 28±29.
171
Id. at 30.

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 144 Side A

 

11/16/2021 08:40:42



ͳͳȀͻȀʹͲʹͳͳǣʹ

2021]
WITHOUT A LEGGETT
TO STAND
ON for Retroactive A277
Wilson: Without a <em>Leggett</em>
to Stand
On: Arguing

expressly provide that the lessor shall bear some portion of these costs; (2)
identify with particularity the deductions to be taken; and (3) indicate the method
of calculating the amount to be deducted.174 The Court further held that lease
language stating the royalty will be calculated ³at the wellhead´ is ambiguous
and, therefore, ineffective to permit the lessee to deduct post-production
expenses.175
VI.

LITIGATION AND LEGISLATION: LEGGETT V. EQT PRODUCTION
COMPANY

Following Tawney, the law was well-settled that the lessee in a freely
negotiated lease could not deduct post-production expenses, unless the lease
expressly stated otherwise.176 This decision, however, only involved freely
negotiated leases.177 Flat-rate leases governed by section 22-6-8 were not
discussed in either Wellman or Tawney, and the Court did not consider whether
Tawney had any effect on section 22-6-8 for another decade.178
A. Leggett I
Plaintiffs/lessors were owners of an undivided 75% interest in a 2,000acre mineral estate in Doddridge County, West Virginia.179 The property was
subject to a 1906 lease, which called for a $300 flat-rate royalty.180 EQT
Production Company (³EQT´), the successor lessee, drilled several natural gas
wells on the property, and section 22-6-8 required EQT to pay a one-eighth
royalty on these wells.181 The lessors sued EQT and several related entities,182
alleging that the lessee had improperly deducted post-production expenses from
their royalties.183 EQT did this, the lessors claimed, primarily by establishing
subsidiaries that charge the lessors for otherwise impermissible expenses.184

Id. at 30.

175

Id.
Ward Jr., supra note 2.

176
177
178
179
180
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174

Id.
Id.
Leggett II, 800 S.E.2d 850, 853 (W. Va. 2017).
Leggett I, No. 16-0136, 2016 W. Va. LEXIS 890, at *3±4 (W. Va. Nov. 17, 2016).

181

183
184

Id. at *3.
Id. at *8.
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Id. at *4.
These related entities included the parent company, EQT Corporation, and several sisterentities, including: EQT Energy, L.L.C., EQT Investments Holdings, L.L.C., EQT Gathering,
L.L.C., and EQT Midstream Partners, L.P. Id. at *3 n.1.
182
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The majority began its analysis by reviewing both Tawney and
Wellman185 and then shifted its focus to whether the same language²³at the
wellhead´²was ambiguous as used in section 22-6-8.186 The Court found the
statute ambiguous because the same words, when used in the same industry
context, are as ambiguous in the flat-rate statute as they are in a lease.187 The
Leggett I Court emphasized that the statute provided no more detail than the
Tawney leases did regarding gas valuation, royalty methodology, or cost
allocation in particular.188 This lack of guidance gave rise to uncertainty, as there
may be more than one way lessees could comply with the statute.189 Therefore,
the majority found the flat-rate statute ambiguous.190
The Leggett I Court next sought to discern section 22-6-¶V legislative
intent in order to give the flat-rate statute its proper effect.191 The majority found
that section 22-6-8 was enacted to right past wrongs, as revealed in the legislative
findings and declarations ³indelibly engraved into the statute itself.´192 Although
the statute would achieve its goal of providing mineral owners with adequate
compensation regardless of whether the ³marketable product´ or ³at the
wellhead´ rule was adopted,193 the Court believed it would have been ³perversely
inconsistent´ for a ³Legislature so passionately dedicated to ensuring the future
flow of adequate compensation to oil and gas landowners to have purposefully
provided a mechanism of royalty valuation specifically designed to curtail that
compensation.´194 Accordingly, the Court adopted, by a 3-2 majority, the
marketable product rule for flat-rate leases195 and held that royalties paid
according to section 22-6-8 must be one-eighth of the of the sale price and cannot
be diluted with costs incurred beyond the wellhead.196

Id. at *12±15.

186

Id. at *15.
Id.

187
188
189
190
191
192
193

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 144 Side B

185

Id. at *16.
Id.
Id. at *15±16.
Id.
Id. at *16±17.
Id. at *17.

194
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Id. at *17±18.
Id. at *18. The Court said that, although the implied covenant to market does not apply to
the original flat-rate royalty, the VWDWXWH³unquestionably altered the basis of the parties¶ bargain
going forward.´ Id. at *19. Therefore, the implied covenant to market applied to the wells in
question. Id.
196
Id. at *22±23.
195
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B. Leggett II
Following Leggett I, EQT petitioned the Court for a rehearing, arguing
the Court had misapprehended the applicable law.197 Fortunately for EQT, West
Virginia Supreme Court Justice Brent Benjamin, Leggett I¶s author, lost his 2016
re-election bid to Justice Beth Walker, who took the bench in 2017.198 The newly
comprised Court granted EQT¶s petition and withdrew its Leggett I opinion, with
Justice Walker serving as the swing vote.199
Upon rehearing, the Leggett II Court found that the Leggett I majority
had misapprehended the applicability of contract principles to statutory
interpretation.200 The new majority re-examined Wellman and Tawney201 but
found both inapplicable because the driving force behind each²the implied
covenant to market²does not append itself to statutes.202
Free from these common law constraints, the Court resorted to canons
of statutory interpretation and again sought the Legislature¶s intent in enacting
the flat-rate statute.203 The new majority found that section 22-6-8 was enacted
to ensure fair and adequate compensation for West Virginia¶s mineral owners.204
The Leggett II Court found this intent expressed in plain and unambiguous
language, demanding royalties be paid at the wellhead.205 Additionally, the new
majority believed the Legislature¶s purpose of ensuring adequate compensation
for mineral owners would still be achieved when royalties are subject to
deductions.206 The Leggett II Court ultimately held that royalties paid according
to section 22-6-8 are subject to deductions for post-production expenses and that
lessees may use the net-back method when calculating these royalties.207
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197
Respondent¶s Petition for Rehearing, Leggett I, No. 16-0136, 2016 W. Va. LEXIS 890 (W.
Va. Dec. 19, 2016).
198
Ken Ward Jr., Motion Seeks to Stop WV Gas Royalty Case Rehearing, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE-MAIL (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/special_reports/motionseeks-to-stop-wv-gas-royalty-case-rehearing/article_67037da1-d0b6-5287-b5adab69ce6034bb.html.
199

Ken Ward Jr., How One West Virginia Supreme Court Justice Gave Natural Gas a Big
Victory and Shortchanged Residents, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 20, 2018, 2:00 PM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/west-virginia-supreme-court-justice-beth-walker-gavenatural-gas-a-big-victory-and-shortchanged-residents.
200
201
202
203
204

206
207

Id. at 860±62.
Id. at 863.
Id. at 864.
Id.
Id. at 867.
Id.
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Leggett II, 800 S.E.2d 850, 855 (W. Va. 2017).
Id. at 858±60.
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Before concluding, the new majority acknowledged that this holding
stood in direct contrast to Tawney and the rules governing freely negotiated
leases;208 it felt this divergence was the inevitable result of applying two different
canons of construction, however.209 Nevertheless, the Leggett II Court invited
the West Virginia Legislature to clarify its intent regarding whether section 226-8 allows lessees to charge lessors for post-production expenses:
[T]his Court recognizes the inherent tension between holders of
leases subject to our interpretation of West Virginia Code § 226-8 and those freely-negotiated leases which remain subject to
the holdings of Wellman and Tawney. We therefore implore the
Legislature to resolve the tensions as it sees fit inasmuch as this
Court may only act within the confines of our constitutional
charge.210
Justice Margaret Workman, who joined the majority opinion, concurred
to emphasize that lessees must not abuse the right to deduct certain expenses and
urged the Legislature to enact provisions ensuring that lessors are not charged
unreasonable expenses.211 Most notably, Justice Workman echoed the new
majority by inviting the Legislature to clarify whether section 22-6-8 permits
post-production expenses to be deducted from royalties:

208

Id. at 868.

209

Id. at 868±69.
Id. at 869 (emphasis added).

210
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What both the foregoing and the majority¶s opinion underscores
is the necessity of the Legislature to address these policy-laden
issues and declare, by statute, the will of the State¶s citizenry in
this regard. This Court is constrained to our canons of statutory
construction and does not make policy. . . . Where the
Legislature¶s inaction in the face of such significant changes in
the industry leaves this Court to intuit its intentions and/or
retrofit outdated statutory language to evolving factual
scenarios, the will of the people is improperly disregarded.212
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211
Id. (Workman, J., concurring). The Legislature responded by enacting West Virginia Code
section 37C-1-EHWWHUNQRZQDVWKH³&KHFN6WXE%LOO´$QGUHZ*UDKDPWest Virginia, 4 OIL &
GAS, NAT. RES., & ENERGY J. 463, 470 (2018). This statute requires lessees to provide each lessor
specific information relating to production, such as production date, volume of hydrocarbons
produced, and price each product sold for; in the event a lessee does not provide this information,
the statute confers a cause of action upon the lessor for disclosure and the right to reasonable
DWWRUQH\V¶IHHVSee W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37C-1-1 (West 2018).
212
Leggett II, 800 S.E.2d at 871 (Workman, J., concurring).
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The Court¶s expressed invitations indicated the 2018 West Virginia
Legislative Session would be a bellwether moment for mineral owners, as the
Legislature was tasked with clarifying whether the Leggett II &RXUW¶V
interpretation of section 22-6-8 was correct.213
C. Legislative Response to Leggett II: Senate Bill 360
The Legislature immediately responded to the Court¶s invitations to
clarify whether section 22-6-8 allows deductions for post-production expenses.
On January 24, 2018, Senate Bill 360 was introduced in the West Virginia
Senate.214 The bill¶s short title stated it was ³clarifying oil and gas permits not
[to] be on flat well royalty leases.´215 Senate Bill 360 proposed to change the
statute¶s royalty basis from the ³total amount . . . at the wellhead´ to ³the gross
proceeds, free from any deductions for post-production expenses, received at the
first point of sale to an unaffiliated third-party purchaser in an arm¶s length
transaction.´216 The bill also included a note that stated ³[t]he purpose of this bill
is to clarify the royalty owed to a royalty owner in an oil and gas lease.´217
While enacting Senate Bill 360, several Senators explained that the bill
was a response to Leggett II¶s invitations to clarify the law. For example, Senator
Randy Smith expressed his understanding that Leggett II said ³the Legislature
need[ed] to clarify the law because it was unclear.´218 He further explained that
Leggett II¶s invitations were the catalyst for Senate Bill 360.219 Similarly, Senator
Michael Romano, after discussing the confusion produced by the pair of Leggett
decisions, reiterated that the Court ³invited [the Legislature] to straighten it out
one way or another.´220 While being voted on in the Senate, Senator Charles
Trump declared that Senate Bill 360 would ³reverse or nullify, redefine the
outcome of [Leggett II]´ and prohibit lessees from deducting post-production
expenses.221 The Senate passed Senate Bill 360²by a vote of 34-0²on February
43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 146 Side A

213
Scott Windom, Big Boys Coming For WV Mineral-Landowners: What Does The Leggett
Decision Mean For You?, HUR HERALD (Aug. 24, 2017), http://www.hurherald.com/cgibin/db_scripts/articles?Action=user_view&db=hurheral_articles&id=64740.
214
S.B. 360, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2018).
215
216

Id.
Id.

217

Id.
Hearing on S.B. 360 Before the West Virginia S. Judiciary Comm., 83d Leg., Reg. Sess.
8:36:38
(2018),
http://sg001harmony.sliq.net/00289/Harmony/en/PowerBrowser/PowerBrowserV2/20180224/-1/20850.
218

219

Id. at 8:37:24.
Id. at 8:56:18.

221

Debate on S.B. 360, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. 10:42:40 (W. Va. 2018), http://sg001harmony.sliq.net/00289/Harmony/en/PowerBrowser/PowerBrowserV2/20180228/-1/20873.
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28, 2018.222 The House of Delegates then passed the bill with a vote of 96-2.223
Governor Jim Justice signed Senate Bill 360 into law on March 9, 2018, ensuring
mineral owners will receive one-eighth of the gross proceeds, free from postproduction expenses.224
VII.

SECTION 22-6-8, AS AMENDED BY SENATE BILL 360, OVERRULED
LEGGETT II AND APPLIES RETROACTIVELY

Part VII argues that section 22-6-8, as amended by Senate Bill 360,
clarified the statute¶s prohibition on post-production expenses and therefore
applies retroactively. Section A explains how natural gas companies dilute
royalties by carefully structuring their businesses in such a way that maximizes
the amount of deductible expenses,225 while Section B illustrates that the netback method is used to deny mineral owners adequate compensation.226 Next,
Section C proves that the net-back method works an unjust hardship on mineral
owners.227 Finally, Section D argues that Senate Bill 360 clarified section 22-68¶s prohibition of post-production expenses and therefore applies
retroactively.228
A. The Net-Back Method in Practice

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 146 Side B

At first blush, the net-back method may sound like an equitable way to
allocate costs between lessor and lessee; however, lessees use the net-back
method to fleece lessors of their valuable minerals. Gas companies²EQT in
particular²best effectuate this by creating wholly-owned subsidiary companies
that charge the mineral owner with what would be otherwise impermissible
deductions.229
EQT Corporation, the parent company, utilizes three main subsidiaries
while producing natural gas.230 First, EQT Production Company (³Production´)

222
WEST VIRGINIA SENATE ROLL CALL, S.B. 360, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2018),
https://www.wvlegislature.gov/legisdocs/2018/RS/votes/senate/02-28-0229.pdf.
223
WEST VIRGINIA HOUSE OF DELEGATES, S.B. 360, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2018),
https://www.wvlegislature.gov/legisdocs/2018/RS/votes/house/00283.pdf.
224
225
226
227

S.B. 360, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2018).
See infra Section VII.A.
See infra Section VII.B.
See infra Section VII.C.

228
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See infra Section VII.D.
Abrahm Lustgarten, Chesapeake Energy’s $5 Billion Shuffle, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 13, 2014,
5:45 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/chesapeake-energys-5-billion-shuffle.
230
Order Granting Plaintiffs¶ Motions for Partial Summary Judgment on Alter Ego & Affiliate
Transactions at 3, Secrist v. EQT Corp., No. 14-C-19 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Doddridge Cnty. June 27,
2018) [hereinafter Alter Ego Order].
229
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is responsible for leasing property and, as lessee, drilling for and producing
natural gas.231 Production then sells the gas to EQT Energy, L.L.C., (³Energy´)
at the wellhead.232 Energy relies on EQT Gathering, L.L.C., (³Gathering´) to
gather and transport the gas until Energy sells it to a downstream buyer.233
These relationships become even more convoluted, and at times
intertwined, once payments are due. The best way to fully appreciate these
intricacies is to work backwards, beginning downstream, and finishing at the
wellhead. Energy ultimately sells the gas to an unaffiliated third-party buyer,
where it receives the gross proceeds.234 Gathering then charges Energy for its
transportation services,235 based on an annual rate that Gathering sets;236 Energy
pays Gathering by deducting the gathering and transportation costs from the
gross proceeds and is left with the net proceeds.237 Energy pays the net proceeds
to Production, which it claims to be the ³wellhead price.´238 Production uses the
net proceeds²instead of the gross proceeds²to calculate the mineral owner¶s
royalty.239
Interestingly, EQT Corporation (³EQT´) appears absent from the entire
process, from well to sale. This is not because EQT is uninvolved with its
subsidiaries, but quite the opposite. EQT uses these subsidiaries as alter egos to
avoid paying the full royalties owed to mineral owners.240 EQT restructured its
business²forming these subsidiaries²following Wellman¶s holding that the
mineral owner¶s royalty must be based on the first point of sale.241 EQT relies on
the fallacy that these intra-company sales are arm¶s-length transactions among
independent entities, allowing it to base royalties on the wellhead sale between

231
Order Resolving Motions at 41, Kay Co. v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 1:13-CV-151 (N.D. W. Va.
Sept. 20, 2017).
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232
Dep. Transcript of Kristy Toia at 51:22±52:1, Richards v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 1:17±CV±50
(N.D. W. Va. Nov. 30, 2017); Dep. Transcript of John Bergonzi at 66:10±15, W.W. McDonald
Land Co. v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 2:11-CV-418 (S.D. W. Va. June 11, 2013).
233
Order Resolving Motions, supra note 231, at 41; Alter Ego Order, supra note 230, at 3.
234

Alter Ego Order, supra note 230, at 3.
Dep. Transcript of Kristy Toia, supra note 232, at 124:6-10. Gathering, as well as the other
(47 HQWLWLHV XVHV ³(47 0LGVWUHDP´ DV D ILFWLWLRXV WUDGH QDPH 'HIHQGDQWV¶ 0RWLRQ IRU
Disqualification of Judge Timothy Sweeney at 1 n.1, Goff v. EQT Corp., No. 16-C-22 (W. Va. Ci.
Ct. Ritchie Cnty. Jan. 15, 2021); see also Alter Ego Order, supra note 230, at 3.
236
Dep. Transcript of Kristy Toia, supra note 232, at 50:6±10.
235

237
Alter Ego Order, supra note 230, at 3. Energy engages in a legal fiction at this point in the
calculations. Rather than using the actual price received by a third-pDUW\SXUFKDVHULQDQDUP¶Vlength transaction as the gross proceeds, Energy uses an index price for the value of gas at the
interstate pipeline. Id.
238

240
241

Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 13.
Dep. Transcript of John Bergonzi, supra note 232 at 65:5±66:5; Ward Jr., supra note 2.
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Production and Energy.242 This position is indefensible because these entities are
one and the same.243 EQT and its subsidiaries act in unison and assign profits to
each group.244 The entities then agree to a consolidated business plan with the
aim of doing what is best for EQT.245 Any profits the subsidiaries accrue
ultimately make their way back to EQT Corporation, as the parent company
controls what capital each subsidiary may own.246
B. The Net-Back Method Provides Wholly Inadequate Compensation to
Mineral Owners
Gas companies claim the net-back method is a fair way of allocating to
mineral owners their pro rata share of expenses, but this pays mere lip service to
the idea of equity. Instead, lessees carefully structure their businesses²by
forming alter egos²in order to maximize the amount of deductions that can be
taken, thereby diluting the mineral owner¶s royalty payment. Such a scheme
enables the lessee to dictate how much the lessor¶s royalty will be, to the point
he receives wholly inadequate compensation for his valuable minerals.
Proponents of the net-back method argue that mineral owners should not
fret about gas companies inflating costs because the latter is responsible for the
remaining seven-eighths.247 This position is incorrect because it fundamentally
misunderstands how the net-back method works in practice. While the total costs
are in fact a zero-sum game, which costs are deductible remains in flux. Each
subsidiary, Production, Energy, and Gathering, are best thought of as
departments, amongst which EQT¶s total costs must be distributed. Because
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242
Order Resolving Motions, supra note 231, at 41 (referring to these intracompany sales as
³the fly in the ointment´ of EQT¶s business model); Alter Ego Order, supra note 230, at 5; see also
W.W. McDonald Land Co. v. EQT Prod. Co., 983 F. Supp. 2d 790, 804 (S.D. W.Va. 2013)
(³[EQT] cannot calculate royalties based on a sale between subsidiaries at the wellhead when the
defendants later sell the gas in an open market at a higher price. Otherwise, gas producers could
always reduce royalties by spinning off portions of their business and making nominal sales at the
wellhead.´).
243
Order Resolving Motions, supra note 231, at 50 (finding that the subsidiaries ³have
corporation or LLC behind their names but are not real companies, but follow their parent¶s orders
and directions.´); Alter Ego Order, supra note 230, at 5.
244
245

Order Resolving Motions, supra note 231, at 45.
Id.

246
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Id. at 55.
See, e.g., Leggett II, 800 S.E.2d 850, 866 (W. Va. 2017); Kilmer v. Elexco Land Servs.,
Inc., 990 A.2d 1147, 1158 (Pa. 2010) (³While [lessors] present a concern that gas companies may
inflate their costs to drive down the royalties paid, we find that claim unconvincing because gas
companies have a strong incentive to keep their costs down, as they will be paying seven-eighths
of the costs.´).
247
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Production¶s costs are not deductible,248 EQT has no incentive to allocate
expenses to Production. On the other hand, every expense Gathering accounts
for can be charged to the mineral owner as a post-production expense,249 thereby
incentivizing EQT to assign Gathering as many expenses as possible.
Unsurprisingly, EQT does exactly that. The rate that Gathering charges includes
not only the costs of gathering and transporting the gas but also meals and
entertainment, uniforms, meter operations and repair, personal property taxes,250
salaries, retirement, medical insurance, and office supplies.251
EQT effectively treats mineral owners as business partners that have
agreed to shoulder not only the costs of marketing natural gas but also those
associated with running the corporate entity. Such treatment is inconsistent with
the lessor¶s true relationship to the lessee: the former merely supplies a raw
material and, in exchange, receives a portion of the sale proceeds.252
Unsurprisingly, mineral owners are left feeling the net-back method¶s harsh
effect. In some instances, EQT¶s deductions exceeded the sales proceeds,253
meaning the mineral owner owed EQT for selling his valuable minerals.254 The
net-back method leaves mineral owners stripped of their minerals without
payment and is the ³wholly inadequate compensation´ the flat-rate statute
intended to eradicate.
C. The Net-Back Method Works an Unjust Hardship on Mineral Owners
Allowing lessees to deduct post-production expenses via the net-back
method works an unjust hardship on mineral owners for several reasons. For

250
251
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248
Wellman v. Energy Res., Inc., 557 S.E.2d 254, 263±64 (W. Va. 2001) (citing Davis v.
Hardman, 133 S.E.2d 77 (1963)) (noting that royalties are not chargeable with production
expenses).
249
See Order Resolving Motions, supra note 231, at 41.

W.W. McDonald Land Co. v. EQT Prod. Co., 983 F. Supp. 2d 790, 816 (S.D. W. Va. 2013).
Transcript of Trial, supra note 8, at 150±52.

252

Accord Leggett I, No. 16-0136, 2016 W. Va. LEXIS 890, at *21 (W. Va. Nov. 17, 2016)
³In a properly functioning royalty system, lessor-owners of oil and gas interests are accurately
cast as suppliers of raw materials necessary to develop a finished product. For such raw materials,
such lessor-owners are paid a one-eighth proportionate price accounted for as a cost of goods sold.
Lessor-owners do not sign on to be the lessee¶s business partner or a participant in a joint venture
with the lessee, and they should not be compelled to assume risks or expenses that would typically
be associated with that sort of role.´ 
253
Dep. Transcript of Kristy Toia, supra note 232, at 117:6±22.
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254
This is especially egregious conduct. EQT claims to sell the gas at a loss, despite West
Virginia¶s recognition of the ³cessation of production doctrine.´ This doctrine allows a lessee to
temporarily halt production if the reason for doing so is incidental to normal operation of the lease.
Bryan v. Big Two Mile Gas Co., 577 S.E.2d 258, 266 (W. Va. 2001). Further, a lease will not
terminate for lack of production if the lessee has a good faith belief that operations will be
profitable in the future. Lowther Oil Co. v. Miller-Sibley Oil Co., 44 S.E. 433, 436 (W. Va. 1903).
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starters, lessees will naturally deduct expenses that are either unreasonable or not
actually incurred.255 This, in turn, places mineral owners in a bind. Savvy lessors,
who realize their royalties are being diluted, will look to pursue legal action.
Unfortunately, some mineral owners will be unable to hire counsel because their
damages²the amount of improper deductions²are not enough to warrant a
lawsuit.256 Based on these realities, gas companies perform a cost-benefit
analysis when deciding what expenses to deduct from royalties.257 The result is
unsurprising: the company makes a calculated business decision to deduct as
many post-production expenses as possible.258
Mineral owners that have the resources to litigate royalty disputes still
face an uphill battle. Lessees that shortchange their lessors¶ royalties force the
latter to hire an attorney, file suit, and then endure years of litigation,259 an act
the West Virginia Supreme Court has expressly warned against.260 Lessors face
yet another hurdle during discovery when they must parse through the lessee¶s
intra-company sales records.261 Improper expenses are often artificially inflated
and hidden under less suspicious line items,262 impeding the fact-finding process.
255

Lustgarten, supra note 19.
See Wilhelm v. Jay-Bee Prod. Co., No. 15-0768, 2016 WL 5941934, at *4 (W. Va. Oct. 13,
2016) (Loughry, J., concurring) (memorandum decision).
257
Dep. Transcript of John Bergonzi, supra note 232, at 90:6±22.
256

258
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See W.W. McDonald Land Co. v. EQT Prod. Co., 983 F. Supp. 2d 790, 816 (S.D. W. Va.
2013); EQT also deducts severances taxes from lessors¶ royalties, despite the fact that West
Virginia Code section 11-13A-3(a) clearly places this responsibility on the producer alone. Dep.
Transcript of John Bergonzi at 276:18±20, Kay Co. v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 1:13-CV-151 (N.D. W.
Va. Aug. 17±18, 2018). This practice is simply indefensible. Under West Virginia law, the lessor
is not responsible for paying any portion of severance taxes. Transcript of Trial, supra note 8, at
201 (ruling that EQT¶s decision to charge the lessor for severance taxes is erroneous as a matter of
law).
259

Patrick Leggett, the named plaintiff in the Leggett decisions, endured four and half years of
litigation before passing away on May 7, 2017, a mere 19 days before Leggett II was decided.
Patrick
D.
Leggett,
PARKERSBURG NEWS & SENTINEL
(May
9,
2017),
https://www.newsandsentinel.com/obituaries/2017/05/patrick-d-leggett/. Similarly, Garrison
Tawney, the named Plaintiff in Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, L.L.C., passed
away at age 90, three years prior to his case making it before a jury. HUR HERALD (Sept. 16, 2004),
http://www.hurherald.com/obits.php?id=12700.
260
Justice Loughry ³caution[ed] [lessees] that this Court does not condone business practices
that compel citizens to institute litigation to enforce their rights. . . . [Lessees] which
opportunistically attempt to take advantage of citizens with limited resources to vindicate their
rights will find little favor with this Court´Wilhelm v. Jay-Bee Prod. Co., No. 15-0768, 2016 WL
5941934, at *4 (W. Va. Oct. 13, 2016) (Loughry, J., concurring) (memorandum decision); see also
Warner v. Haught, Inc., 329 S.E.2d 88, 96 (W. Va. 1985) (admonishing lessees that withhold delay
rental royalties and force lessors to seek judicial relief).
261
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Abrahm Lustgarten, Unfair Share: How Oil and Gas Drillers Avoid Paying Royalties,
PROPUBLICA (Aug. 13, 2013, 10:20 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/unfair-share-howoil-and-gas-drillers-avoid-paying-royalties.
262
Anderson, supra note 65, at 602±03.
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Deciphering these records is a daunting task that even the nation¶s best forensic
accountants struggle to perform.263 Consequently, royalty disputes often become
a battle of the experts, and the lessor¶s expert maximizes the amount of improper
deductions found, while the lessee¶s expert minimizes the same.264 In the end,
the lessor receives damages that are a product of compromise, either by
settlement or court order.265 Results such as this further injure minerals owners
because gas companies are incentivized to inflate their purported costs with the
aim of finding a more favorable middle ground in future disputes. This
behavior²artificially inflating costs in order to better the bottom line²works
an unjust hardship on all mineral owners, especially those who do not have the
means to vindicate their rights.
D. Senate Bill 360 Clarified Section 22-6-8’s Prohibition of PostProduction Expenses and Applies Retroactively
Although there is a general presumption against retroactive legislation,
statutory amendments that clarify existing law apply retroactively.266 Indeed,
statutory amendments do not ipso facto constitute a substantive change in the
law.267 The legislature, for instance, may amend the existing law to make its
original intent unmistakably clear.268 Clarifying amendments, therefore, are no
more retroactive than a judicial determination construing and applying a statute
because each merely states what the law is and has always been.269

Lustgarten, supra note 19.

264

Anderson, supra note 65, at 602±03.
Id. at 602.

265
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263

266

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2-2-10 (West 2017) (allowing statutory amendments to be applied
retroactively when the legislative intent is apparent from the context); Piamba Cortes v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999) (³[When an] amendment clarifies prior law
rather than changing it, no concerns about retroactive application arise and the amendment is
applied to the present proceeding as an accurate restatement of prior law . . . [because] an
amendment containing new language may be intended µto clarify existing law, to correct a
misinterpretation, or to overrule wrongly decided cases.¶´) (quoting United States v. Sepulveda,
115 F.3d 882, 885 n.5 (11th Cir. 1997)); Leshinsky v. Telvent GIT, S.A., 873 F. Supp. 2d 582, 590
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (³Notwithstanding th[e] presumption [against retroactive legislation], several
[courts] have held that when an amendment merely clarifies existing law, rather than effecting a
substantive change to the law, then retroactivity concerns do not come into play.´); Brown v. Crum,
400 S.E.2d 596, 599 (W. Va. 1990) (per curiam) (retroactively applying a statutory amendment
intended to clarify the Legislature¶s original intent); State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Youler, 396 S.E.2d
737, 750±51 (W. Va. 1990) (same).
267

United States v. Montgomery Cnty., 761 F.2d 998, 1003 (4th Cir. 1985).
Id.

269

First Nat¶l Bank of Chi. v. Standard Bank & Tr., 172 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 483 (7th Cir. 1993)).
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There is no bright-line test to determine whether an amendment clarifies
existing law.270 Factors to consider include: (1) whether the legislature declared
that it was clarifying a prior enactment; (2) whether a conflict or ambiguity
existed prior to the amendment; and (3) whether the amendment is consistent
with a reasonable interpretation of the prior enactment.271 Declarations found in
the amendment¶s legislative history may be relevant to the analysis, especially if
those statements are consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the prior
enactment.272 The fact that an amendment conflicts with a judicial interpretation
of the prior enactment is not dispositive; the amendment may be intended to
clarify a conflict that resulted from the judicial interpretation.273
The West Virginia Legislature passed Senate Bill 360 to clarify section
22-6-8¶s prohibition on post-production expenses. Although section 22-6-8, as
amended by Senate Bill 360, does not expressly state that it clarified the law
following the Leggett decisions, or overruled Leggett II, the context surrounding
its enactment proves this was the Legislature¶s intent. First, Leggett II diverged
from Leggett I¶s interpretation of the flat-rate statute, conflicting whether ³at the
wellhead´ allows lessees to deduct post-production expenses.274 Senate Bill 360
was enacted to resolve this conflict. Second, section 22-6-8, as amended by
Senate Bill 360, is consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the original
enactment. The Leggett I Court interpreted the original enactment to demand that
royalties be paid on the gross proceeds received, free from post-production
expenses.275 Senate Bill 360 codified this interpretation of section 22-6-8. Third,
the Leggett II Court, after recognizing these conflicting results, implored the
Legislature to clarify the law and ³declare, by statute, the will of the State¶s
citizenry.´276
Senate Bill 360¶s legislative history confirms the Legislature¶s intent to
clarify, rather than alter, section 22-6-8. To begin with, the Legislature acted in
response to Leggett II¶s invitations to clarify the law; indeed, Senate Bill 360 was
43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 149 Side B

270

Levy v. Sterling Holding Co., 544 F.3d 493, 506 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v.
Marmolejos, 140 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 1998)).
271

Middleton v. City of Chicago, 578 F.3d 655, 663±64 (7th Cir. 2009).
Piamba Cortes v. American Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1284 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing
Sykes v. Columbus & Greenville Ry., 117 F.3d 287, 293±94 (5th Cir. 1997)); Liquilux Gas Corp.
v. Martin Gas Sales, 979 F.2d 887, 890 (1st Cir. 1992) (using the ³legislature¶s expression of what
it understood itself to be doing´ to determine whether an amendment clarified the law).
273
Levy, 544 F.3d at 507.
272

274

275
276

Leggett I, 2016 W. Va. LEXIS 890, at *16±17.
Leggett II, 800 S.E.2d at 871 (Workman, J, concurring).
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Compare Leggett I, No. 16-0136, 2016 W. Va. LEXIS 890, at *3±4 (W. Va. Nov. 17, 2016)
(prohibiting natural gas companies from deducting post-production expenses from flat-rate
royalties), with Leggett II, 800 S.E.2d 850 (W. Va. 2017) (allowing natural gas companies to deduct
post-production expenses from flat-rate royalties).
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passed the very next legislative session.277 Several pieces of legislative material
also prove that Senate Bill 360 was intended to clarify the law, including the note
attached at introduction that stated the bill was ³clarify[ing] the royalty owed.´278
Senate Bill 360¶s short title²declaring that it was ³clarifying oil and gas permits
not [to] be on flat well royalty leases´²reaffirms this conclusion.279 Equally
significant are the declarations of several Senators, each recognizing that Senate
Bill 360 was in response to, and intended to overrule, Leggett II. Senators Smith
and Romano each explained that Senate Bill 360 was a direct result of the
Supreme Court imploring it to clarify whether section 22-6-8 permits postproduction expenses.280 Senator Trump¶s remarks are even more telling: he
unequivocally stated that the Legislature was overruling Leggett II.281 These facts
confirm that Senate Bill 360 clarified section 22-6-8 and, consequently,
overruled Leggett II.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 150 Side A

In conclusion, the West Virginia Legislature undoubtedly passed Senate Bill
360 intending to clarify that lessees are prohibited from deducting postproduction expenses from royalties paid according to section 22-6-8. The
Legislature enacted the flat-rate statute to ensure that mineral owners receive
their fair share of compensation for their valuable minerals. Despite this, natural
gas companies have carefully crafted their businesses to dilute royalties owed to
:HVW9LUJLQLD¶VPLQHUDORZQHUVVXFKDVWKH5LFKDUGVHV
Although the West Virginia Supreme Court held that lessees may deduct
post-production expenses in Leggett II, the Court implored the Legislature to
clarify section 22-6-8 in light of changing industry regulations and customs. The
Legislature responded by passing Senate Bill 360: this bill expressly prohibited
lessees from deducting post-production expenses when calculating natural gas
royalties. Further, Senate Bill 360 clarified, as opposed to altering, the existing
ODZ DV VKRZQ E\ WKH ELOO¶V OHJLVODWLYH KLVWRU\ Therefore, section 22-6-8, as
amended by Senate Bill 360, applies retroactively and overruled Leggett II.

Adam H. Wilson*

277

S.B. 360, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2018).

278

Id.
Id.

279
280

See sources cited supra notes 218±220 and accompanying text.
Debate on S.B. 360, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. 10:42:40 (W. Va. 2018), http://sg001harmony.sliq.net/00289/Harmony/en/PowerBrowser/PowerBrowserV2/20180228/-1/20873.
* J.D. Candidate, West Virginia University College of Law, 2022; B.S., Petroleum and Natural
Gas Engineering, West Virginia University Benjamin M. Statler College of Engineering and
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